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ABSTRACT
Die Zukunft ist ungewiss, und sie ist nicht für alle dieselbe. Das Heft untersucht in verglei-
chender Perspektive zeitgenössische Zukunftserwartungen, Formen des Zukunftswissens und 
Strategien des Zukunftsmanagements in Afrika, China und Europa. Während je eigene soziale, 
politische und ökonomische Gegebenheiten Unterschiede im individuellen und kollektiven 
Zugang zu Zukunft bedingen, bringt die Verflechtung der Welt gleichzeitig Parallelen und Kon-
vergenzen hervor. 
“Up until the mid-20th century, the future appeared as something open, shapeable, la-
tently positive, the past as something to be overcome,” German-American cultural theo-
rist Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht explained in 2014, “Now, it is rather the opposite. We see 
the future as a threat scenario of climate catastrophe, demographic crisis, and potential 
new wars, whereas we pay homage to the past in the form of days of remembrance, new 
editions of the classics, new translations, and rediscoveries.”1 This negative outlook on 
the future feeds on familiar old cultural clichés of an allegedly weary Europe, still caught 
in the grip of its past and lacking the confidence and creative power to shape the future. 
It also coincides with a diagnosis of our times, according to which the heroic spirit of 
the modern age has run dry, while the idea of positive progress has been thrown by the 
wayside, and Western civilization seems virtually obsessed with visions of the “future as 
catastrophe.”2 
 M. Stallknecht, Die Schönheit ist tot, es lebe die Schönheit. Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht setzt den Künsten ein Ende, 
in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 8 December 204.
2 So runs the title of a study by E. Horn on Western imaginations of the future in the age of the atomic bomb, 
Comparativ | Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung 26 (2016) Heft 2, S. 7–16.
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There are many plausible reasons for this collective feeling of destabilization and vul-
nerability that are kept alive by continuous disaster reports and dismal predictions and 
which the sociologist Craig Calhoun has referred to as the “emergency imaginary.”3 The 
more important question, however, is why this cultural pattern of interpretation has suc-
ceeded in becoming so influential in Europe (and particularly in Germany), but not (or 
at least not to the same extent) in other global regions.4 As the following brief remarks 
on China, Africa, and Europe will demonstrate, approaches to the future vary greatly 
from a global perspective.
In China, approaches to the future are determined by the systemic particularities and 
historical legacies of post-colonialism, post-socialism, and authoritarianism. Although 
China faces challenges that are not so unlike those of other societies – in particular, 
declining growth and environmental degradation – the ways these challenges are tackled 
often bear the traces of these particularities and legacies. 
China’s colonial experience in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries left a 
deep and enduring impact on its perceptions of the international order and China’s place 
therein. Statist concepts of China and worries about the future of the Chinese state in 
a zero-sum perception of international competition prevail.5 Nationalism as compensa-
tion for past humiliation can be found in broader sections of society.6 Also, issues of 
identity and notions of difference and particularity are major threads in the social sci-
ence discourse.7 On the one hand, these are responses to a history of Western intrusion 
and Eurocentrism in contemporary international affairs and global discourse. On the 
other hand, they are fostered and instrumentalized by the authoritarian party-state, with 
its emphasis on sovereignty and stability as a matter of national survival. Party-defined 
systemic particularity (“socialism with Chinese characteristics”) and promises of China’s 
future power (“China’s rise,” the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” and the 
“Chinese dream”) are important elements in the Party’s strategy of legitimizing its one-
party rule.8
climate change, and large-scale technological accidents: Zukunft als Katastrophe, Frankfurt/M. 204. See also A. 
Assmann, Ist die Zeit aus den Fugen? Aufstieg und Fall des Zeitregimes der Moderne, München 203. 
3 C. Calhoun, A World of Emergencies. Fear, Intervention, and the Limits of Cosmopolitan Order, in: Canadian 
Review of Sociology and Anthropology 4 (2004), p. 392.
4 See also A. Kirk, Eastern Countries Far More Optimistic than Their Western Counterparts, in: The Telegraph, 6 
January 206, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/208440/Eastern-countries-far-more-
optimistic-than-their-Western-partners.html (accessed 8 January 206).
 N. Knight, Imagining Globalisation: The World and Nation in Chinese Communist Party Ideology, in: Journal of 
Contemporary Asia 33 (2003) 3, pp. 38–337; N. Spakowski, National Aspirations on a Global Stage – Concepts 
of World/Global History in Contemporary China, in: Journal of Global History 4 (2009) 3, pp. 47–49.
6 M. Leifer (ed.), Asian Nationalism, London 2000; P. Gries, China’s New Nationalism. Pride, Politics and Diplomacy, 
Berkeley 200; L. Li, China’s Rising Nationalism and Its Forefront, in: China Report  (20) 4, pp. 3–326.
7 A. Dirlik, Zhongguohua. Worldling China: The Case of Sociology and Anthropology in Twentieth-Century China, 
in: A. Dirlik, Culture and History in Post-Revolutionary China. The Perspective of Global Modernity, Hong Kong 
20, pp. 97–240; N. Spakowski, Socialist Feminism in Post-Socialist China, in: positions 206 (in print).
8 K. Denton, China Dreams and the “Road to Revival”, in: Origins: Current Events in Historical Perspective 8 (204), 3, 
pp –2, http://origins.osu.edu/article/china-dreams-and-road-revival (accessed 8 January 206); J. Mahoney, 
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The legacy of socialism can be found in various aspects of the discourse on and manage-
ment of the future. At the level of ideology, the Communist Party still claims to uphold 
Marxist-Leninist principles and has declared socialism as the ultimate (but very distant) 
goal of China’s development.9 China’s current economic system is a particular form of 
capitalism that follows the capitalist logic of production and distribution, but is marked 
by the legacies of a command economy.10 These include, first of all, a continued belief in 
planning and the ability to forecast and control the future. To be sure, the detailed Five 
Year “Plans” of the pre-reform period have turned into Five Year “Programmes” with the 
mere function of macro-guidance.11 Nevertheless, the planning state sets the course of 
China’s development.
Indeed, the economy is the main subject of discussions about China’s future. Similar to 
the African case, these discussions are international in nature and are also nourished by 
Western hopes and anxieties regarding global business cycles and investment opportuni-
ties. Visions of an “Asian,” “Chinese,” or “African century” are fuelled by the potential for 
so-called “emerging” economies or “late developers” and their expected scope of develop-
ment and growth in the process of “catching up” with advanced economies.12 Specialists’ 
worries about China’s future economic performance notwithstanding, the very fact that 
it is “lagging behind” gives China space for future development – either quantitatively as 
measurable growth, or qualitatively as a system “transition.”13 Given China’s spectacular 
growth rates since the beginning of its “reform and opening” in 1978, Chinese political 
elites – and many Western observers – have begun to regard China as a new global power. 
Chinese and Western talk of “China’s rise” and a “China model,” or a “Beijing consen-
sus” – i.e. a model of development independent of Western prescriptions that is suitable 
for imitation by other developing states – have become important elements in the reas-
sessment of current and future global power structures.14 At the same time, increasing 
liberalization and the opening of its borders to the world market exposes China to the 
Interpreting the Chinese Dream: An Exercise of Political Hermeneutics, in: Journal of Chinese Political Science 
9 (204) , pp. –34.
  9 On the Fifteenth Party Congress in 997, then President Jiang Zemin proclaimed that socialism would be rea-
ched within a time span of at least one century, see N. Knight, Imagining Globalisation, p. 332.
0 J. Peck and J. Zhang, A Variety of Capitalism…with Chinese Characteristics?, in: Journal of Economic Geography 
3 (203) 3, pp. 37–396; J. Osburg, Global Capitalism in Asia: Beyond State and Market in China, in: The Journal 
of Asian Studies 72 (203) 4, pp. 83–829; C. McNally, Sino-Capitalism. China’s Reemergence and the Internatio-
nal Political Economy, in: World Politics 64 (202) 4, pp. 74–776.
 S. Heilmann, Making Plans for Markets: Policy for the Long Term in China, in: Harvard Asia Quarterly 3 (20) 
2, pp. 33–40; S. Heilmann, From Local Experiments to National Policy: The Origins of China’s Distinctive Policy 
Process, in: The China Journal 9 (2008), pp. –30.
2 N. Spakowski, Asia as Future – The Claims and Rhetorics of an “Asian Century”, in: M. Frey and N. Spakowski (eds.), 
Asianisms, Regionalist Interactions, and Asian Integration, Singapur 20, pp. 209–236.
3 See the contribution by Doris Fischer in this issue.
4 For the China Model, Beijing Consensus and related terms, see S. Breslin: The “China Model” and the Global Crisis. 
From Friedrich List to a Chinese Mode of Governance?, in: International Affairs 87 (20) 6, pp. 323–343; J. 
Fewsmith, Debating “the China Model”, in: China Leadership Monitor 3 (20), www.hoover.org/publications/
china-leadership-monitor/article/93636 (accessed 8 January 206). For “China’s rise”, see N. Spakowski, Asia as 
Future.
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volatilities of global business cycles, and vice versa. China’s economic performance is thus 
increasingly seen as a decisive factor of global economic prospects, with falling Chinese 
stock prices sending “shock waves” around the world.15 
In addition to mere prospects of growth, future potential also lies in systemic change. In 
contrast with discussions in the West, China does not perceive its economic and political 
system as settled. Terms such as “modernisation” (xiandaihua), “reform” (gaige), or “tran-
sition” (zhuanxing), which were slowly introduced in the late 1970s following earlier 
concepts of “revolution” (geming), indicate a constant situation of change, albeit without 
a clear idea of where this change is leading to. To this day, China remains incomplete in 
the eyes of its political and intellectual elite. In other words, completeness is a feature of 
the past and a hope for the future. One can only guess how rapid and open-ended change 
is affecting the lives and mental health of Chinese citizens. 
Another factor to consider is the authoritarian nature of the Chinese state. Given its 
one-party rule and repressive political system, the discourse and management of the fu-
ture are dominated by the state and thus centred on its techniques of survival. Generally 
speaking, the state is caught in a dilemma between liberalizing and opening the country 
up to the outside world as instruments of economic success and legitimizing the regime 
and the control of the pluralism and the dissident forces resulting from this very process 
of liberalization. The logic of how it makes accessible, manages, and instrumentalizes the 
Internet is just one of the many examples of this dilemma.16 Today’s discourse about Chi-
na’s future is thus marked by the regime’s anxieties about its stability as well as concerns 
of a global nature, such as environmental issues and terrorism, which are often framed as 
factors of stability or destabilization. As for the political system, the survival of the one-
party state depends on its ability to constantly adapt to new challenges and to respond to 
citizens’ concerns without giving way to Western-style democracy. Thus, top-down rule 
has been replaced by what experts call “consultative” or “deliberative authoritarianism.”17 
As for its economic policy, China’s situation is no different from that of other countries 
in that the imperative of growth based on capitalist logic produces negative side effects, 
such as environmental degradation and extreme social inequality.18 With its declining 
growth rates in recent years, China is also now even more in line with the difficulties of 
Western economies. In contrast with the West, however, these problems are not simply 
problems as such or systemic problems of capitalism, but rather problems caused by the 
rule of the Communist Party that impinge on its claims of legitimacy. Finally, the social 
 H. Ersen, Börsencrash in China sendet Schockwellen um die Welt (Stock Market Crash Sends Shock Waves Around 
the World), Reuters Deutschland, 8 July 20, http://de.reuters.com/article/topNews/idDEKCN0PI0YR200708 
(accessed 8 August 20).
6 See the contribution by Christian Göbel in this issue.
7 J. Teets, Let Many Civil Societies Bloom: The Rise of Consultative Authoritarianism in China, in: China Quarterly 
23 (203), pp. 9–38. B. He and E. Warren, Authoritarian Deliberation: The Deliberative Turn in Chinese Political 
Development, in: Perspectives on Politics 9 (20) 2, pp. 269–289. T. Wright, Stable Governance and Regime 
Type. Contemporary China in Comparative Perspective, in: S. Guo (ed.), State-Society Relations and Governance 
in China, Lanham 204, pp. 7–84.
8 See also the contribution by Doris Fischer in this issue.
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dynamic unleashed by the country’s reforming and opening itself has led to what was 
formerly a rather conform populace splitting into a variety of interest groups, creating 
potential for conflict both between groups and between the state and civil society. The 
concept of “social management” (shehui guanli) once again testifies to the state’s vision 
of a manageable future.19 The state thus places its hope of stability on the middle class, 
regarding it as an ally and as the norm for consumption-oriented, politically docile, and 
self-disciplined citizens.20 According to a recent global opinion poll, “China was the 
most optimistic country surveyed,” with the percentage of optimists being “four times 
the global average of 10 per cent.”21 However, the source of Chinese citizens’ optimism 
and how this relates to the party state’s anxieties concerning stability is a problem that 
has yet to be studied.
On the African continent, on the other hand, possible futures seem even more divergent 
and unpredictable. Most great visions of the future stem either from those who make it 
their business to bring about a specific future for Africa – development experts, donors, 
and international organizations – or from those whose business relies on selling forecasts 
– the global media, consultants, or think tanks. Such visions have their own conjec-
tures. While prophets of doom dominated the early 2000s, a new narrative of “Africa 
rising” gained prominence ten years later, only to be called into question again.22 Such 
discourses are dominated by external actors and are decoupled from societal discussions 
within Africa to a greater extent than in Europe and China. While the experts sell visions 
of Africa’s future, people in all regions of Africa think about and work toward their own 
individual and collective futures.23 
Both, future talk and future making, stand under the conditions of Africa’s place in the 
global order. Most better-off countries in Africa are dominated by commodity exports. 
The financialization of commodity markets, growing price volatility, and the rhythm of 
commodity super cycles are strong external conditions that leave little room for inde-
pendent planning. The largely informal economies in the service and distribution sec-
tors further diminish the ability to plan. On the micro level, the unpredictability that 
characterizes both the formal and the informal economy often translates into diversified 
9 F. Pieke, The Communist Party and Social Management in China, in: China Information 26 (202) 2, pp. 49-6; 
J. Liu, From Social Management to Social Governance: Social Conflict Mediation in China, in: Journal of Public 
Affairs 4 (204) 2, pp. 93–04; J. Fewsmith, “Social Management” as a Way of Coping With Heightened Social 
Tensions, China Leadership Monitor 36 (202), pp. –8.
20 L. Tomba, Of Quality, Harmony, and Community: Civilization and the Middle Class in Urban China, in: positions 
7 (2009) 3, pp. 9–66; X. Wang, Desperately Seeking Status: Political, Social and Cultural Attributes of China’s 
Rising Middle Class, in: Modern China Studies 20 (203) , pp. –44; A. Anagnost, From ‘Class’ to ‘Social Strata’: 
Grasping the Social Totality in Reform-Era China, in: Third World Quarterly 29 (2008), pp. 497–9.
2 A. Kirk, Eastern Countries Far More Optimistic.
22 T. Dietz, Silverlining Africa: From Images of Doom and Gloom to Glimmers of Hope, Leiden 20; F. Nyamjoh, 
Africa, the Village Belle: From Crisis to Opportunity, in: Ecquid Novi: African Journalism Studies 34 (203) 3, pp. 
2–40; see also Amanda Hammar’s contribution in this issue.
23 B. Frederiksen, Young Men and Women in Africa: Conflicts, Enterprise and Aspiration, in: Young: Nordic Journal 
of Youth Research 8 (200), 3, pp. 249–28; A. Mbembe, Les Jeunes et l’Ordre Politique en Afrique Noire, Paris 
98; C. Monga, Anthropologie de la Colère: Société Civile et Démocratie en Afrique Noire, Paris 99.
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household strategies in which security is sought through flexibility rather than planning. 
This dichotomy between grand visions and navigating everyday insecurity perhaps most 
clearly characterizes African relations to the future.
The one grand narrative that orders discourses as well as practices is the narrative of 
development. A huge sector of African economies relies on development thinking and 
donor money. Its rationale is clear: sometime in the future, African countries will be 
developed. Until then, they will remain on a path to development, and with well-de-
signed projects, planning, and policies, and with the right priorities (now rebaptized 
“sustainable development goals”), a brighter future awaits the continent. The future is 
never about safeguarding achievements; it is always about moving to some other, better 
place. For more than sixty years now, this narrative has been kept alive and has informed 
radically opposing policies. Its lack of transformative effects has often been rationalized 
as a consequence of internal conditions (“bad governance,” “bad infrastructure,” “state 
failure,” “lack of education,” etc.), thus opening up new doors for outside intervention. 
The explanations of experts and the measures they propose are never independent of 
their conceptions of the future in Europe, the US, and (to a growing extent) China, and 
their relation to African realities is often questionable. 
In parallel to these discourses and practices, and often influenced by them, people all 
over Africa plan their individual and collective futures. Young people in particular must 
work toward their personal futures under extremely unstable conditions.24 Formal sector 
jobs are extremely rare and are often only to be gained through personal connections. 
Capital for individual enterprises is very hard to come by, and the growing income in-
equality is creating a new upper middle class whose ostentation is only increasing the 
frustration of those who do not make it. In this climate of competition, the possibility 
for young people to participate economically, politically, and socially in their societies is 
often more important to them than the direction these societies are taking. Changing the 
future means changing one’s own place in it, and while the importance of a dignified life 
as a full member of one’s society continues to increase (and is often expressed through 
consumption), the importance of macro politics is on the wane.25 
As a rule, however, the future seems to look less bleak to many than this might suggest. 
People are constantly busy planning for the future, or waiting for it to happen. They 
devise projects, look for patronage, wait for co-optation by those who have made it, or 
they find the initiative, energy, and funds necessary to look for greener pastures else-
where. While global discourses about African futures are still dominated by developmen-
24 A. Honwana, The Time of Youth: Work, Social Change, and Politics in Africa, Boulder 202; D. Mains, Hope is Cut: 
Youth, Unemployment and the Future in Urban Ethiopia, Philadelphia 200; H. Vigh, Motion Squared: A Second 
Look at the Concept of Social Navigation, in: Anthropological Theory 9 (2009) 4, pp. 49–438.
2 For more careful analyses, see e.g. E. Cooper, Students, Arson, and Protest Politics in Kenya: School Fires as 
Political Action, in: African Affairs 3 (204) 43, pp. 83–600; T. Förster and L. Köchlin (eds.), The Politics of 
Governance. Actors and Articulations in Africa and Beyond; New York 20; A. Honwana, Youth, Waithood and 
Protest Movements in Africa, Lugard Lecture 203. http://www.internationalafricaninstitute.org/downloads/lu-
gard/Lugard%20Lecture%20%20203.pdf; D. Resnick and D. Casale: Young Populations in Young Democracies: 
Generational Voting Behaviour in Sub-Saharan Africa, in: Democratization 2 (204) 6, pp. 72–94.
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tal thinking, young Africans have long entered a phase of post-developmental practice. 
Thinking about the future and acting to bring it about have diverged as widely as have 
the worlds of development experts from African peasants or ordinary city dwellers.
Western European societies, in contrast, generally negotiate their relationship with the 
future predominantly via prevention and self-organization, and it is around these two 
factors that they orient their semantics and action. They thus replaced the future disposi-
tive of planning that was prevalent up until the early 1970s. The erosion of optimistic 
expectations for the future and the rise of a pessimistic outlook in Western Europe can be 
dated fairly precisely. Whereas the first decades after the Second World War were defined 
by a planning boom in which the future was regarded as the responsibility and product 
of socio-technocratic management, these self-same planning authorities and programmes 
became the object of growing criticism in the 1970s, when the feasibility and desirability 
of future planning via policies met with more and more opposition. The publication 
of the report “The Limits of Growth” by the Club of Rome26 in 1972 and the 1973 oil 
crisis are often regarded as the initial triggers of this change, which also occurred within 
the broader context of a slump in the global economy, the end of the economic post-war 
boom, the crisis of the Fordist production regime, and a growing awareness of ecological 
issues. As a result, promises of progress became less plausible, or they were projected onto 
other parts of the world in the discourse of development. The public became preoccu-
pied with a fear of the future, which was often expressed in apocalyptic scenarios.
The future seemed not only inevitably contingent; it also seemed extremely endangered, 
especially by threats that “are marked by two principle features: a context of scientific 
uncertainty on one side, the possibility of serious and irreversible damage on the other.”27 
Nuclear power and genetic engineering were prominent examples of this, as were eco-
logical issues, like the forest dieback (Waldsterben), anthropogenic climate change, and 
the threat of nuclear weapons. The Chernobyl nuclear disaster made it ultimately obvi-
ous that negative views of the future could be realistic after all. Such dangers cannot 
be calculated using methods of probabilistic risk assessment. They exceed all limits of 
what is insurable, and they hold enough catastrophic potential to make their prevention 
necessary for human survival. The philosopher Hans Jonas coined the term “heuristics 
of fear” to describe this perspective of the future.28 He argued that what was needed was 
a new categorical imperative: “‘Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with 
the permanence of genuine human life’; or expressed negatively: ‘Act so that the effects of 
your action are not destructive to the future possibility of such life’; […] or most gener-
ally: ‘In your present choices include the future wholeness of Man among the objects of 
26 D. Meadows et al., The Limits of Growth, Washington 972; for the genesis and reception of the book, see P. 
Kupper, “Weltuntergangs-Vision aus dem Computer“. Zur Geschichte der Studie ‚Die Grenzen des Wachstums’ 
von 972, in: J. Hohensee and F. Uekötter (eds.), Wird Kassandra heiser? Beiträge zu einer Geschichte der falschen 
Öko-Alarme, Stuttgart 2004, pp. 98–
27 F. Ewald, The Return of the Crafty Genius: An Outline of a Philosophy of Precaution, in: Connecticut Insurance 
Law Journal 6 (999) , pp. 60–6.
28 H. Jonas, Responsibility Today: The Ethics of an Endangered Future, in: Social Research 43 (976) , p. 87.
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your will.’”29 As with the Kantian Imperative, this imperative remained only a normative 
postulate with no long-term influence on political decisions or on daily practices. Fear of 
the apocalypse and business as usual turned out to be compatible.
There is a bitter irony in the fact that the ecological ethics of preservation have become 
a guiding principle of the “war on terror” after 9/11, when they went through a decisive 
transformation. The call to stop all activities that could threaten the continued existence 
of human life has become a kind of boundless activism in the name of security. A future 
outlook fixated on the catastrophe that can happen any moment is what lends general-
ized and unrestrained security policies plausibility and political legitimation. 
The collapse of Soviet-style political regimes in 1989 and the triumph of neo-liberal 
programmes – starting with Margaret Thatcher’s destruction of the British welfare state 
in the 1980s – have fundamentally changed the political rationality of Western societies 
and have initiated an entirely new way of dealing with the future. To key figures of neo-
liberal governance, the future now seems like an emergent process that follows its own 
laws – one that generally cannot be influenced by setting political limits, and if so, then 
not for the better. Their solution has thus been market-based self-regulation instead. 
Generalized “competition as a discovery procedure”30 and the mobilization of autono-
mous, flexible, and innovative “entrepreneurial selves”31 have guided their interventions, 
in which any action is interpreted as an investment in, and thus a wager on, the future. 
Self-organization via competition has thus acquired a status similar to planning in the 
1950s and 1960s. However, competition also requires institutional protection, albeit 
not to correct the negative effects of the market. Quite the contrary, it is needed to pave 
the way for the free play of supply and demand by eliminating external interference 
factors. The focus of this neo-liberal safeguarding of the future has thus not been on 
deregulation in the sense of laissez faire, but on the active – i.e. planned – promotion of 
competition. 
The agenda of radical marketization, which regards unleashing the potential of self-or-
ganization as the best of all possible futures, correlates with a social grammar of security 
that attempts to control catastrophic expectations of the future through pre-emptive 
strategies. The neo-liberal management of the future – which through its promotion of 
competition translates the contingency of the future into individual investment deci-
sions, the rationality of which is bound to the economic tribunal of the market – goes 
hand in hand with policies of securitization32 that are essentially illiberal. The rationality 
of contemporary governance in Western European societies is thus based on two axioms: 
first, to be able to achieve the best, competition must not be inhibited; second, if we 
want to prevent the worst, everything must be permitted. 
29 Id., Technology and Responsibility: Reflections on the New Tasks of Ethics, in: Social Research 40 (973) , p. 44.
30 See F. A. Hayek, Competition as a Discovery Procedure, in: ibid., The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, Vol. XV: Mar-
kets and Other Orders, Chicago 204, pp. 304–33.
3 U. Bröckling, The Entrepreneurial Self. Fabricating a New Type of Subject, London 206.
32 See B. Buzan, O. Wæver and J. de Wilde, Security. A New Framework for Analysis, London 998.
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Although ideas about the future and practices of future management differ greatly be-
tween the global regions of Africa, China, and Europe, it would be misleading to assume 
that these futures are homogenous and disconnected from the ideas and practices of the 
other regions. The imperative of growth and accumulation of globalized capitalism and 
the transnational dangers of a “world risk society”33 leave no room for methodological 
regionalism. Multiple futures are entangled futures.
With this in mind, we must focus on research that does not limit itself to juxtaposing 
and comparing disparate notions of the future and practices of managing the future and 
that does not ignore the pluralism of futures and/or assume a homogenous world future. 
What is needed is a multi-perspective analysis of the “entanglements” of notions of the 
future and future-oriented practices. Such an analysis would have to treat the relation-
ship between multiple futures and one future as an empirical problem. It would have to 
analyse how regional futures connect with what transregional and/or global dynamics of 
the future; and it would have to look at what translation processes take place in which 
direction, and what transformations different complex ideas about the future undergo 
in the process.
Its primary focus should be on the central role of capitalism as the global political and 
economic order that integrates markets, produces economic and financial crises of a 
global scale, installs transnational production chains,34 and is sustained by transnational 
companies and a transnational capitalist class.35 Globalized capitalism converges mental-
ities and life styles, as can be seen in the example of the middle class (as the fundamental 
societal group) and its orientation on consumption. Its inevitable logic of growth gener-
ates specific expectations for the future. These can be positive hopes of progress, or nega-
tive fears of crises, or doom and gloom scenarios. Fundamental themes of contemporary 
discourses on the future and future technologies – the pressure to innovate born out of 
international competition, climate change, terrorism, and migration – have a complex 
global angle, albeit with a specific regional colouring. For example, while Europe is de-
bating the question of whether to open or close its borders and whether this could affect 
its future cultural identity, migration to the North is relieving the demographic pressure 
in many African nations, with the money migrants sending home also serving as an im-
portant factor for economic development. Very often, attempts in one global region to 
secure the future create insecurities in other regions. One paradigmatic example of this is 
the financialization of commodity markets, which is driven by the search for stable and 
predictable returns on capital, thereby increasing volatility and often destroying predict-
ability at the lower end of value chains.
The discourses of future global power relations are also fundamentally relational. Themes 
like “China’s rise,” “US decline,” or “the West and the rest” refer not only to global en-
33 U. Beck, World Risk Society, London 999.
34 J. Chan, P. Ngai and M. Selden, The Politics of Global Production: Apple, Foxconn and China’s New Working Class, 
in: New Technology, Work & Employment 28 (203) 2, pp. 00–.
3 J. Harris, Outward Bound: Transnational Capitalism in China, in: Race & Class 4 (202) , pp.3–32.
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tanglements, but also to debates about the supposed “neo-colonialist” relations between 
China and Africa. Ultimately, individual strategies for the future are often connected to 
transnational mobility. Studying abroad, labour migration, and the capital flight36 of pri-
vate investors are all individual investments in the future to which target countries react 
by internationalizing their universities (and often raising tuition for foreign students) or 
by founding campuses abroad, offering residence permits based on qualifications, recruit-
ing qualified workers, or establishing tax havens or citizenship-by-investment models.37
While historians have been writing global history as the history of global “entangle-
ments” for some years now, research of the “entanglement” of notions of the future and 
future-oriented technologies is still emerging. The following articles on Africa, China 
and Europe will contribute to laying the foundations for this task. 
36 A. MacDonald, P. Vieira and W. Connors, Kapitalflucht. Chinesen schaffen Geld kofferweise nach Kanada, in: Spie-
gel online, 2 January 203, http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/kapitalflucht-chinesen-bringen-
ihr-geld-aus-dem-land-a-87399.html (accessed 8 January 206).
37 A. Shachar and R. Hirschl, On Citizenship, States, and Markets, in: Journal of Political Philosophy 24 (204) 2, pp. 
23–27.
